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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we investigate the credit risk in the loan portfolio of banks following different 
business models. We develop a data-driven methodology for identifying the business models 
of the 365 largest European banks that is suitable for very granular harmonised supervisory 
data. Our dataset allows us to take into account the full range of the activities in which banks 
are involved. The proposed method combines in an optimal way data clustering, dimensionality 
reduction and outlier detection. We identify four business models and exclude as ‘outliers’ 
banks that follow idiosyncratic business models. Furthermore, empirical evidence is provided 
that banks following different business models differ significantly with respect to the credit risk 
they undertake in their loan portfolios. Traditional commercial banks are characterized by the 
lowest levels of credit risk while the loan portfolios of securities holding banks are riskier 
compared to the other banks. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
This paper applies a novel methodology to classify all systemically important Eurozone banks into 
business models, utilising a uniquely granular dataset. Our emphasis is on the post-financial-crisis 
banking system of Eurozone countries. We aim to overcome the limitations of the business model 
clustering approaches used in the literature that are based on narrow sets of broad pre-defined 
variables and do not fully capture the range of activities performed by banks. Our methodology 
combines optimally classification, dimensionality reduction, and outlier detection at the same time 
and accounts for the existence of idiosyncratic mixtures of banks’ activities present in banks’ business 
models (as noted e.g. in Mergaerts and Vennet, 2016). Furthermore, we contribute to the non-
performing loans literature by providing empirical evidence that the business model choice can 
explain the differential credit risk of banks’ loan portfolios in addition to the usual country- and bank-
specific determinants. 
The concept of ‘business model’ is increasingly used to refer to the heterogeneous mixture of 
activities to which banks engage and the difference in risk-return outcomes that this entails 
throughout different phases of the financial cycle (e.g. Yellen, 2012; Carney, 2015; Draghi, 2016). 
There is a burgeoning literature which proposes methods to classify banks into business models 
(Roengpitya et al., 2014; Ayadi et al., 2015; Köhler, 2015; Mergaerts and Vennet, 2016; Hryckiewicz 
and Kozlowski, 2017; Lucas  et al., 2017). However existing empirical studies usually concentrate 
on a limited set of pre-selected dimensions when classifying banks into business models. In contrast, 
our method is data-driven and instead of relying on researcher’s priors utilizes a unique, harmonised 
dataset detailing the activities undertaken by banks with an unprecedented level of granularity. 
The paper contributes to filling the gap in the literature regarding banks’ business models in the 
following ways. First, it formulates a methodology for identifying business models using granular 
data. Our proposed methodology combines optimally classification with dimensionality reduction 
allowing us to infer the factors which primarily determine banks’ business models. It also 
incorporates an outlier detection component, allowing to identify banks which follow especially 
idiosyncratic business models, and whose inclusion into the normal clusters of banks would 
‘contaminate’ the sub-sample and affect the results of analyses on differential risk or performance 
across business models. 
Second, a unique data set, which has been made possible by the centralisation of supervision in a 
subset of countries within the European Union and the collection of supervisory data using 
harmonised definitions, is utilised. Our granular dataset comprising in total 1039 variables allows us 
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to avoid biased classifications due to mismeasurement which could arise when broad categories are 
used, as will be explained below. In addition, the emphasis on the cross-sectional granular dimension 
of the input dataset is justified due to the slow-changing nature of banks’ business models.1 
Third, we identify the distinctive characteristics pertaining to each business model as regards the 
credit risk present in their loans portfolio, complementing the existing literature on the determinants 
of non-performing loans (Nkusu, 2011; Louzis et  al., 2012; Klein, 2013; Ghosh, 2015; Anastasiou 
et al., 2016). According to our knowledge this is the first econometric study on the link between 
banks’ business models and the credit risk of their loans portfolio. We find that there are statistically 
significant differences on the credit risk of banks following discrete business models, even after 
controlling for the potential endogeneity of the business model choice. 
Our paper complements and leverages previous research on banks’ business models. During the last 
couple of years a number of studies appeared that derive the business model classification from a 
narrow set of predefined variables (Roengpitya et al., 2014; Mergaerts and Vennet, 2016; Lucas et 
al., 2017), usually dictated by data availability. Other studies use a classification provided by the data 
provider (e.g. Köhler 2015, Becchetti et al., 2016) like the Bankscope’s ‘specialisation’ attribute or 
focus on bank’ ownership i.e. public or private (Eichengreen and Gupta, 2013). However, it has been 
already noted in the literature that the concept of business models, at least in Europe, belongs to a 
continuum (Mergaerts and Vennet 2016) if a restricted number of dimensions is used to classify 
banks. 
Some specific examples will be used to illustrate the need to employ a granular dataset in order to 
distinguish banks into business models. For example, in previous studies broad categories like ‘loans’ 
or ‘deposits’ are used to identify the mix of activities into which banks engage. Therefore, a bank 
that holds an amount of loans to real economy agents above a certain threshold would most probably 
be classified as a traditional bank rather than an investment bank, however one may have to look also 
at off-balance sheet items, like loan commitments, to identify correctly a bank’s involvement in 
financing the real economy. For example, BNP Paribas one of the largest bank in Europe, has off-
balance sheet loans commitments and financial guarantees to the real economy representing 56% of 
the loans to the real economy which it holds in the balance sheet.2
 
Therefore, the classification of 
                                                     
1 Our classification results remain unchanged to a level higher than 95% when a different reference date within the 
2014Q4 – 2015Q3 time period is used. This is expected as in a short time frame the composition of banks’ activities is 
not expected to change significantly. This is consistent also with the approach adopted in the literature. For example, 
Lucas et al. (2017) assume a fixed cluster assignment although their data set spans a larger time period while Mergaerts 
and Vennet (2016) find that ‘between’ variation (differences across banks) exceeds the ‘within’ variation (changes over 
time within banks) for a sample of banks from 30 European countries. Finally, also studies which define business models 
with respect to governance structures assume constancy of business models (e.g. Becchetti et al., 2016). 
2 Loans to the real economy equal EUR 712 bln while the sum of loan commitments and financial guarantees to the real 
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such banks depends crucially whether one relies on broad aggregates (like the value of loans in the 
balance sheets) because these aggregates may not represent fully the range of the banks’ activities, 
or whether one adopts a more granular view that permits a robust identification of the range of 
activities in which the bank is involved (e.g. by taking into account information on off-balance sheet 
financing). 
The measurement of banks’ involvement in real sector lending is also highly affected by credit risk 
conditions. As a result, traditional banks with large volumes of non-performing loans could be 
mistakenly perceived as being less focused on providing loans to the real economy, because in the 
balance sheet statements the amount of net loans is given i.e. the amount of loans after deducting 
allowances. This is the variable used in the literature, however when banks increase allowances this 
amount will diminish as a percentage of assets. The statistics for the Greek banks illustrate clearly 
this point: between end-2009 and end-2016 their amounts of gross loans to the domestic real economy 
remained almost unchanged (from EUR 188 bln to EUR 185 bln), however net loans decreased by 
20% (from EUR 177 bln to EUR 141 bln) due to much higher provisions.3
 
As a result, one could 
think that they decreased their activities in the real economy during this period, however this results 
is an artefact of their higher provisions due to realised credit risk and not of a change in their business 
model.  
In addition, information on the use of derivatives, which in existing studies is found to be a distinctive 
element of different business models, could easily be distortive, if one does not incorporate 
information on both carrying amounts and notional values, or uses information on only the asset or 
the liability side, or does not take into account the intended use of derivatives e.g. as hedging or 
trading instruments. If only one of these measures is taken into account, then a distorted view of the 
degree to which a bank uses derivatives will be obtained, affecting subsequently its classification into 
business model clusters. 
Finally, classifications based e.g. on the class of a bank within a national financial system would 
probably also not be optimal. For example, the German ‘Landesbanken’ differ among themselves as 
regards the composition of their balance sheets e.g. their composition of funding sources. 
Consequently, lumping these banks into one category would distort results of an econometric 
analysis. For example, deposits from other banks or customers are generally an important source of 
                                                     
economy equal EUR 404 bln, according to the bank’s 2016 financial statement: 
https://invest.bnpparibas.com/sites/default/files/documents/etats_financiers_31.12.16_en.pdf. 
3 Source: Bank of Greece statistics on the aggregate balance sheet of Greek credit institutions. 
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funding for Landesbanken, however the percentage varies considerably4
 
and consideration of 
additional granular information on the remaining part of the liability side is needed in order to classify 
these banks meaningfully to a business model. 
All the examples presented above show why using a narrow set of variables to classify banks into 
business models could be problematic and potentially misleading. Consequently, there is a high value 
added of using a granular data set as the multidimensional concept of a business model requires 
detailed information to be captured and an identification methodology which can handle such 
granular information. A business model identification method which uses granular input data needs 
to perform not only clustering, but also dimensionality reduction and the identification of factors, in 
addition to including outlier detection in the sense of identifying banks following very idiosyncratic 
business models. Besides granularity, other features of our dataset render it ideal for the purpose of 
identifying banks’ business models. First, the dataset includes all large banks in Europe, with 
harmonised data consolidated at the prudential perimeter. This means that it provides the most 
reliable information on banks of systemic importance operating in Europe without exclusions which 
may bias the results e.g. inclusion of only listed banks. Furthermore, the prudential perimeter of 
consolidation as opposed to accounting consolidation or use of stand-alone data is optimal when 
considering banks’ business models from a financial stability perspective because it provides 
simultaneously a consolidated view of banks activities while abstracting from non-banking activities 
which possess very different risk characteristics than banking. Finally, it is important to note that all 
banks in our sample operate under the same regulatory environment, based on the transposition of 
Basel III in Europe via the CRD IV package, therefore the effect of regulation on the composition of 
the portfolio of their activities is similar. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the literature on the concept of the 
business model and on relevant empirical studies on banking. Section 3 describes the input set and 
presents the clustering methodology. Section 4 presents the results and provides a discussion about 
the identified business models. Section 5 conducts an econometric analysis of the link between 
business models and credit risk in the loan portfolio. Finally Section 6 concludes. 
  
                                                     
4 Specifically, some Landesbanken rely almost exclusively on deposits for their funding, either from other 
banks or from customers while for some other this is not the case e.g. the Oldenburgische Landesbank  had according to 
its 2016 financial statement more than 85% of its funding via deposits, while this percentage is less than 50% for 
Landesbank Baden-Württemberg – again as shown in the bank’s 2016 financial statement. 
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2. Review of the literature 
 
 
The literature of business models in banking had been until recently driven mainly by the concept of 
‘strategic groups’, introduced by Hunt (1972). The concomitant concept of ‘mobility barriers’ (Caves 
and Porter 1977) had been introduced to explain persistent performance differentials between firms 
within one industry and also applied in banking (Amel and Rhoades 1988; DeSarbo and Grewal 2008, 
Halaj and Zochowski 2009; Mehra 1996; Reger and Huff 1993; Tywoniak et al. 2007). Clustering 
methods are applied to identify strategic groups and consequently performance indicators are 
examined to assess whether performance differences exist. Data constraints are dictating the choice 
of the dimensions along which clustering is performed while the focus has been always in national 
or regional banking systems. Expert judgment is used extensively in the selection of the input set. 
 
 
2.1. Empirical analyses of banks’ business models 
 
In the last years there is an expanding number of empirical studies of banking systems based on the 
business model concept. Roengpitya et al. (2014) (RTT henceforth) provide a clustering method to 
distinguish an international sample of banks according to their ‘business models’, based on the 
Ward’s algorithm (1963), by using a selection of asset and liability variables (choice variables). 
Specifically, RTT define business models based on eight balance sheet ratios (loans, securities, 
trading book, interbank lending, customer deposits, wholesale debt, stable funding and interbank 
borrowing) which are interpreted as “reflecting strategic management choices” that leverage on the 
strengths  of each organisation. They test their model on 1299 data points from 222 banks operating 
in 34 countries across the period 2005-2013, identifying three main business profiles: the Retail-
funded, the Whole-funded and the Trading one. Finally, they provide a description of the bank 
performance for each business cluster by using a selection of key balance sheet ratios (outcome 
variables). 
Ayadi and de Groen (2014) and Ayadi et al. (2015) also define banks’ business models based on their 
activities. They examine a set of European banks (covering 80% of all banking assets in EEA in 
Ayadi and de Groen (2014)) and select a small number of dimensions (specifically, loans, trading 
assets, liabilities to other banks, customer deposits, debt liabilities and derivative exposures5) to 
perform hierarchical clustering. Both RTT and Ayadi et al. clearly distinguish between “activities”, 
which determine the business model, and “outcomes”, the latter measured by profitability and 
                                                     
5 In Ayadi et al. (2015), liabilities to other banks and customer deposits were substituted by customer loans, because the 
expansion of the dataset compared to Ayadi and de Groen (2014) imposed more constraining data limitations. 
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performance indicators. 
Ayadi and de Groen (2014) find that retail banks, specifically the two business models which they 
label “diversified retail” and “focused retail”, exhibit lower leverage compared to the business models 
of “investment” and “wholesale” banks which depart from the traditional intermediation function. 
However, this lower leverage is not reflected in their risk-adjusted ratios which are similar across 
business models, which can be interpreted as a symptom of “risk optimisation” on the part of 
sophisticated large banks. The results regarding performance are not clear-cut, also because of the 
volatility in the time dimension, however, it seems that “diversified retail” banks performed overall 
better than the other business models when taking into account both the pre- crisis and the crisis 
periods. Ayadi et al. (2015) expand the sample compared to Ayadi and de Groen (2014) and cover 
95% of all banking assets in EEA. They also find that retail banks are less risky than wholesale and 
investment banks when using market measures of risk. RTT identify three business models and also 
find that their “retail-funded” banks perform better than “wholesale-funded” and “trading” banks 
while “trading” banks hold the higher levels of capital. Other studies which follow this line of 
research include Köhler (2015), Mergaerts and Vennet (2016), Hryckiewicz and Kozlowski (2017) 
and Lucas et al. (2017). 
The important distinction between “choice” and “outcome” variables, aims to differentiate the set of 
variables reflecting strategic choices from the differential performance which is investigated ex post. 
The empirical strategies followed to classify banks into strategic groups usually focus on balance 
sheet “choice” variables (Amel and Rhoades 1988; DeSarbo and Grewal 2008; Mehra 1996). Halaj 
and Zochowski (2009) include additionally income and cost components, however this expansion of 
the type of variables is justified as a proxy for the unavailability of granular balance sheet 
breakdowns. Finally, Tywoniak et al. 2007 use also customer  satisfaction ratings, although this 
seems to be better suited as a performance variable which could be investigated ex post.6
 
 
 
 
2.2. Identification methodologies 
 
The identification of banks’ business models requires the use of clustering methods that are known 
to belong to the class of unsupervised learning methods (Hastie et al. 2009). Agglomerative 
hierarchical methods like the Ward’s clustering method (Ward 1963), which minimises the variance 
                                                     
6 Reger and Huff (1993) should be considered separately in this strand of the literature as they focus on  the cognitive 
dimension of the managers and utilises data originating from interviews with bankers. As regards, the criteria used to 
determine the differences among strategic groups, DeSarbo and Grewal (2008) include performance, efficiency and size 
in the outcome set. Halaj and Zochowski (2009) also incorporate risk indicators (‘irregular loans’) arguing that this allows 
to position banks in a risk-return space, an idea which is especially relevant for the banking sector. 
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within clusters, rely on expert judgment. These methods are not suitable in a high dimensional context 
as it is not so easy to characterize clusters based on a large number of variables. This method is 
employed by RTT who select a priori subsets of  eight  variables representing bank assets and 
liabilities, excluding highly correlated variables.7
  
 
In the direction of classifying large dimensional objects, clustering methods which incorporate a 
dimension reduction process have also been proposed. The dimensionality reduction component is 
critical for the set-up where the input set is granular and relatively large compared to the number of 
entities to be classified. The most obvious way by which dimension reduction issues can be 
incorporated into a clustering methodology could be through applying a principal component analysis 
(Hotelling 1933) or a classical factor analysis before conducting the clustering. Consequently, a 
standard unsupervised clustering algorithm like the Ward’s one on the obtained  principal 
components or factors can be applied. This approach is called tandem analysis (Arabie and Hubert 
1994). 
However, as pointed out in De Soete and Carrol (1994) and De Sarbo et al. (1990), this approach 
may not be the most efficient for classification. The dimensions identified by the principal 
components or the factor analysis are not necessarily the ones that maximise  the  distance  among  
the  latent   clusters  identified  by  the second  step. Performing the dimensionality reduction in a 
separate, initial step may mask or obscure the true cluster structure of the data, since it classifies the 
objects according to directions which are not optimal for discriminatory purposes. 
An effective solution which incorporates dimension reduction into the class of partitional clustering 
techniques labelled as “k-means” (MacQueen, 1967) is provided by Vichi and Kiers (2001), who 
develop the factorial k-means algorithm, where a subspace is defined such that the projected data 
points on this subspace are closest to the centroids. As the name of the procedure suggests, it involves 
both factor analysis (reducing dimensionality) and k-means procedure (clustering objects and finding 
out their centroids in this low-dimensional subspace). We adopt an enhanced version of this clustering 
approach which seems to optimally combine the two essential features, dimensionality reduction and 
clustering. We incorporate in the clustering algorithm an intrinsic procedure to identify outliers 
within clusters, using the factor scores obtained by the iterative algorithm. 
Before proceeding to the detailed description of the methodology used, we mention the alternative 
family of methods based on finite mixture models, which has also been used in the literature to 
                                                     
7 The number of clusters is chosen using the pseudo F-index, as proposed in Calinski and Harabasz (1974), which 
quantifies the trade-off between parsimony and ability to discriminate between clusters. 
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identify banks’ business models (Lucas et al. 2017).8 Density-based approaches are computationally 
heavy in large dimensions, since they are likely to result in a large number of clusters. In addition, 
distribution hypotheses on economic data are potentially more distortive in the banking context than, 
for instance, on genetic data with pre-defined labels (see Lin et al. 2016 and Murray et al., 2014a,b).  
Furthermore, due to the distribution assumptions made in finite mixtures models, the outlier detection 
as regards the banks’ business models cannot readily incorporate information from all input 
dimensions. This may lead to the “contamination” of the identified banks’ clusters with very 
idiosyncratic institutions potentially distorting the results. In addition, several low rank spaces are 
identified instead of one in cited works, with the exception of Murray et al. (2014b). This further 
complicates the description of identified outliers via those methods. 
Compared to the finite mixtures approach as used e.g. in Lucas et al. (2017), our enhanced clustering 
methodology offers the possibility to utilise a granular set of input dimensions, without the need to 
commit to a restricted set of inputs. The “trimmed” factorial k-means approach relies on a least 
squares algorithm which is effective in large datasets, because we identify only one latent space in 
place of several ones with a constrained distribution. In addition, a distribution-free approach lets the 
data speak with respect to the shape of clusters while also identifies banks lying far from the estimated 
clusters (“radial” outliers) without relying on parametric assumptions. 
 
3. Methodology for identifying business models 
 
3.1. Input set 
 
We use a set of proprietary supervisory data which are collected in the context of the ECB 
Supervision. These data have been developed by the European Banking Authority (EBA) and employ 
harmonised definitions, thus representing an ideal set for a comparative analysis across countries. 
The availability of harmonised data across jurisdictions represents a necessary precondition when 
attempting to classify banks into respective business models. 
We focus on Financial Reporting (FINREP) variables, providing a detailed decomposition of the 
balance sheet. FINREP is a standardised EU-wide framework for reporting accounting data, with a 
prudential scope of consolidation. Our sample consists of 365 banks residing in the 19 Eurozone 
countries. All systemically significant banks, as defined by the ECB Supervision (based on their 
                                                     
8 The standard reference on finite mixture models is McLachlan and Peel (2000). Recently, the literature has provided 
robust versions estimating mixtures of multivariate skew-normal (Lin et al. 2016) and skew-t distributions (Murray et al., 
2014a) by maximum likelihood and the EM algorithm respectively. A distribution-free alternative is provided in Yang et 
al., 2017 using trimmed likelihood. Lucas et al. (2017) estimate via EM dynamic mixtures of normal or t distributions 
with time-varying means and possibly covariance matrices and find that the choice of Student’s t causes clusters to be 
more robust to outliers due to fat tails. 
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absolute and within-country, relative size), are included in this sample. Our data set is cross sectional 
with reference date end- 2014. The variables included in the input set could be interpreted as the 
“choice” variables, reflecting banks’ choices about the set of activities in which they are involved. 
In particular, our input set contains information on the banks’ balance sheet composition under four 
types of breakdowns, specifically accounting portfolios, instruments (loans, securities etc), 
counterparties (households, non-financial corporations etc) and products (mortgage loans, credit 
cards etc). Appendix A presents a detailed description of the input data set. 
Each of the 1039 initial variables is standardised using total assets as the scaling factor, except from 
the ‘total assets’ variable which is normalised using its maximum value within the sample. Therefore, 
a ‘size’ variable is retained in the initial data set while almost all the remaining variables lie in the 
interval [0,1] since they are expressed as a percentage of size.9 Standardisation is used because we 
define business models with respect to the composition of banks’ activities, consistently with the 
literature reviewed above, and to avoid a dominance of the classification procedure by the large 
banks. Our results are invariant if the to-asset-ratios of any balance sheet variable and the relative 
size of any bank with respect to the maximum asset size in the sample are kept constant.  
In this initial set there is a number of variables which are highly correlated and information which is 
redundant. Correlation is not per se an issue for the application of our clustering algorithm. However, 
given that we run the clustering algorithm with a number of different initialisations in order to search 
in the space of solutions and that we use the covariance matrix of the input set for the initialisation, 
the presence of nearly duplicated variables among the input data is not desirable. 
Therefore, we follow a procedure to minimise the presence of very correlated variables in the input 
data set. The procedure consists of selecting the variables that should remain in the input set according 
to their ‘importance’, which is measured for each variable as the sum of the absolute correlations 
respect to all the others. This is a pre-processing step intended to avoid nearly duplicated variables 
by detecting pairs of variables that show a sample correlation very close to 1. Taking also into account 
the fact that some of the initial variables were very sparsely populated, we narrowed down the initial 
set of 1039 variables into a final input set of 382 variables (see Appendix B). 
 
3.2. Clustering method 
 
The statistical clustering problem can be defined as follows. Given a 𝑛 × 𝑝 data matrix 𝑋, where 𝑛 is 
the number of banks (objects or observations) and 𝑝 is the number of the variables, we would like to 
                                                     
9 It should be noted that there exist few variables presenting values higher than unity, like notional amounts of derivatives. 
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classify the banks into distinct clusters which contain objects which are ‘close’ in a statistical sense. 
Each cluster would represent a specific business model. The salient feature of our problem is that the 
dimension is relatively high compared to the number of objects: 𝑝 > 𝑛. This feature is not common 
in similar classification problems; typically the objects which are to be classified are many more than 
the number of observed variables. Therefore our problem belongs to the field of clustering in high 
dimensions. In addition, the absolute number of dimensions necessitates the use of data reduction 
techniques in order to compress the large initial data set into meaningful composite variables. 
As explained in Section 2.2, existing studies on clustering banks do not provide a readily available 
suggestion on how to approach the clustering problem in a high dimensional space. Specifically, it is 
not clear how strong is the impact of distribution assumptions for the data in our large-dimensional 
setting. Consequently, density-based clustering methods, which are based on normal or Student’s t 
mixtures, may hinder the interpretation of results. In addition, there is no clear rationale for defining 
ex ante the distribution shapes of variables across business models. Alternative methods, like 
hierarchical and partitioning (i.e. centroid-based) methods, do not provide any dimension reduction 
by themselves. 
Let us call 𝑟 the latent rank (i.e. the dimension of the reduced space) and 𝑐 the number  of clusters. 
In formal terms, the model involves the minimization of a measure of the following matrix 
 𝑿𝑨 − 𝑼?̅?           (1) 
where 𝑨 is a p × r column-wise orthonormal matrix (coefficients matrix), 𝑈 is a n × c membership 
(or grouping) matrix such that 𝑢𝑖𝑗 = 1, if and only if 𝑜𝑖  ∈ 𝑃𝑗 , where 𝑜𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, . . , 𝑛, is the i-th 
observation and 𝑃𝑗, 𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝑐 is the j-th cluster. The c × r matrix ?̅? contains the centroids of the 
cluster in the low rank space. The left term of this expression represents the projections into the factor 
space of the original objects (the transformed variable space or low rank or reduced space), while the 
second term represents the centroids of the clusters. 
Equation (1) lies in the low-dimensional space spanned by the columns of the column-wise 
orthonormal matrix 𝑨. Consequently, the model can be specified as follows 
 𝑿𝑨𝑨′ = 𝑼?̅?𝑨′ + 𝑬                                                                                                                   (2)  
where 𝐸 is a residual matrix. Equation (2) describes the partition in the original space. The optimal 
partition therefore is sought by minimizing the function 
 𝑭(𝑨, 𝑼, ?̅?) = ||𝑿𝑨𝑨′ − 𝑼?̅?𝑨′||
𝟐
= ||𝑿𝑨 − 𝑼?̅?||𝟐     (3) 
which can be equivalently expressed as 
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  𝑭(𝑨, 𝑼) = || 𝐗𝐀 − 𝐔(𝑼′𝑼)−𝟏𝑼′𝑿𝑨 ||𝟐                                                                              (4)  
since ?̅? = (𝑼′𝑼)−𝟏𝑼′𝑿𝑨. This minimisation is performed under the constraints that 𝑨′𝑨=𝑰𝒓 and 𝑼 
is binary with only one non-zero element per row. In geometrical terms, we seek for the orthogonal 
linear combinations of the variables (factors) which best partition the objects by minimising the least-
squares criterion (Eq. 4) in this reduced space. 
We follow a robust approach which belongs to the class of Alternated Least Squares (ALS) 
algorithms (Vichi and Kiers, 2001) which is explained in detail in Appendix C. A discrete clustering 
model and a continuous factorial model are specified simultaneously for our data set. So we perform 
at the same time data reduction (i.e. data synthesis) and variable selection by a single cluster analysis 
method, thus identifying the composite variables which most contribute to the classification of 
objects.  
The strong consistency in statistical sense of the factorial k-means procedure is proved in Terada 
(2015). Underlying assumptions only require that the 𝑝 -dimensional data vectors 𝑋𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, . . , 𝑛, are 
IID with a common distribution 𝑃. The only constraint is that the random space spanned by the 𝑝 
components of 𝑋𝑖 is not isomorphic to any random space of dimension 𝑟, where 𝑟 is the chosen latent 
rank. In high dimensions, it is clear that this is very unlikely to occur as 𝑟 is extremely small with 
respect to 𝑝. Therefore, consistency is ensured if  𝑛 → ∞. Note that the condition 𝑝 ≥𝑛 is not ruled 
out as long as the described constraint is satisfied. 
The selection of the latent rank 𝑟 and the number of clusters 𝑐 is not straightforward. It has to be 
noted that these two parameters depend on each other. Specifically, the number of components 𝑟 
cannot be larger than 𝑐 − 1. The reason is that 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘((𝑼′𝑼)−1𝑼′𝑿𝑨)) = min (𝑐 − 1, 𝑟), therefore 
describing the low-dimensional space of the clusters using more dimensions than necessary does not 
seem to make sense. The process for selecting these parameters will be described in Section 4.1 since 
it combines statistical criteria and the aim of obtaining interpretable results. 
 
3.3. Robustified clustering with simultaneous radial outlier detection 
 
It is known a priori that some institutions in our dataset follow unique business models, e.g. 
functioning as central clearing counterparties, focusing exclusively on refinancing public sector loans 
etc. Therefore, there is a clear rationale for excluding these outliers from the clusters to avoid 
distortions of the final results. We want to make sure that the presence of such cases does not distort 
the classification of banks. Therefore we present a robustified version of the Vichi and Kiers (2001) 
procedure, which identifies clusters taking iteratively into account the presence of radial outliers. Our 
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method is specifically intended to identify the so-called radial outliers, that is, observations deviating 
so much from assigned centroids to be considered external to assigned clusters. Therefore, our 
approach is robust both in the sense of measuring in a robust way the composition of the banks’ 
activities, due to the granularity of the used dataset, and in avoiding the ‘contamination’ of the 
identified clusters with banks following particularly idiosyncratic business models. 
As well established in literature (see e.g. Rousseeuw and Leroy, 2003), the most used method for 
detecting multivariate outliers is via the Mahalanobis distance, D= √(𝑥 − 𝑥)̅̅ ̅ ′𝑺−1(𝑥 − 𝑥)̅̅ ̅, with 𝐷2 
being asymptotically a chi-squared with 𝑝 degrees of freedom under the assumption of normality for 
𝑥 (𝑆 is the unbiased sample covariance matrix). Under the  normality assumption, Hotelling (1933)  
showed  that  𝑡2 = 𝑛(𝑥 − 𝑥)̅̅ ̅ ′𝑺−1(𝑥 − 𝑥)̅̅ ̅,  called Hotelling’s T-squared, is  proportional  to  F𝑝,𝑛−𝑝, 
where F is the Fisher’s F. However, it is easy to see in our context this approximation cannot be used, 
because normality is not respected and the degrees of freedom 𝑛 − 𝑝 would be negative, since 𝑝 >
𝑛. 
The trimmed k-means algorithm proposed in Cuesta-Albatos et al. (1997) could be used to detect 
anomalous data simultaneously with clustering. However, this method may be computationally 
intractable when both 𝑝 and 𝑛 are large while it does not offer a clear interpretation and visualisation 
of the identified clusters in large dimensions. In contrast, we would like to identify both partitions 
and outliers in a reduced space rather than in a p-dimensional space. 
For this reason, a method is developed here to find the partition of the 100 x (1 − α)% most 
concentrated objects with respect to the scores in the low-dimensional space. Specifically, in the 
absence of any distribution assumptions we compare Mahalanobis distances across banks in order to 
exclude radial outliers i.e. banks clearly different from the rest. Mahalanobis distances are based upon 
𝑪𝑭, the unbiased covariance matrix of factor scores estimated over the entire sample, because the 
heuristics based on Equation (4) do not explicitly address the possibility of significantly different 
covariance matrices across cluster.  
In more detail, our problem may be stated as follows. Our task is to minimise 𝑭(𝑨, 𝑼, ?̅?) = ||𝑿𝑨 −
𝑼?̅?||𝟐 under the constraints ∑ ∑ 𝑢𝑖𝑗 = [(1 − 𝛼)𝑛]
𝑐
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1 , ∑ 𝑈𝑖𝑗
𝑐
𝑗=1 ≤ 1 for each 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛, where 
the trimming proportion is α ∈ [0,0.5]. This trimmed problem may be practically solved under the 
framework of Rousseuw and Van Driessen (2000). As a subset selection step (H-step), we set 100 
initialisers and compute the initial estimates of loadings, centroids and cluster memberships by the 
Alternated Least Squares algorithm of Vichi and Kiers (2001). As a concentration step (C-step), we 
compute the Mahalanobis distance at each observation and we exclude the [αn] observations with 
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the largest ones, since they are the observations that contribute the most to 𝐅(𝐀, 𝐔, ?̅?), which is the 
variance within clusters. In this way, it is ensured that 𝐅(𝐀, 𝐔, ?̅?) is decreasing at each step, such that 
the overall optimum is found out over the entire range of initializers which approximate the parameter 
space. The details of the outlier detection part of the algorithm are also described in Appendix C. 
This robustified version of factorial k-means algorithm has two major advantages. First, the clusters 
are optimally shaped, given that distortions arising from the dimensionality reduction stage are 
avoided. Second, the outliers are automatically identified during the procedure by the clustering 
algorithm, with no need of applying any subsequent procedure. 
 
4. Business models and their characteristics 
 
 
4.1. Clusters and factors identified 
 
The selection of the number of clusters and factors follows the methodology described in Appendix 
C. Figure 1 presents the Hartigan’s statistic for different number of clusters and for two different 
strategies of selecting the number of factors which represent the lower and upper bounds, 
respectively. The first strategy is to keep the number of factors fixed and equal to two (2).  The second 
is to use the maximum number of factors, 𝑟 = 𝑐 − 1. In addition, in both cases we plot the results 
both for the case where outlier detection is performed and for the case that no outliers are excluded. 
A common feature of all these lines is that Hartigan’s condition is satisfied for 𝑐 = 4 and therefore, 
we select 4 clusters. 
 
Figure 1: Hartigan’s statistic for different number of clusters and factors. 
 
The maximum number of factors that could be used is c − 1 = 3, however when examining the 
singular values of the n x r matrix (𝑼′𝑼)−1𝑼′𝑿𝑨) (see Vichi and Kiers 2001), it is clear that clusters 
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nearly fall in a subspace with dimensionality lower than 3.10
  
Therefore we select r = 2, a decision 
which is further reinforced by our aim to obtain interpretable results. 
In addition, we set α = 0.1, i.e. the 10% of the banks which are identified as outliers represent a 
separate group. The selection of the quantile value was chosen based on the examination of the set 
of banks which were selected in the outlier set and on the visual examination of results in the low 
dimensional space. Specifically, the chosen parameter values lead to a set of outlier banks that 
contains institutions with idiosyncratic features which are also distinctively far from the clusters’ 
centroids in the low dimensional space, as it will be elaborated later. On the other hand, our 
classification results are not sensitive to this assumption in the sense that the cluster membership of 
all the remaining banks is not affected. 
The two factors produced by the factorial k-means model consist of a ‘level’ factor and a ‘contrast’ 
(slope) factor. Intuitively, the first factor represents a measure of the presence of standard elements 
in banks’ balance sheets, like loans, deposits, derivatives and issued debts, excluding trading assets. 
The second factor represents the contrast between loans and ‘standard liabilities’ (which include 
deposits and issued debt) therefore discriminates banks with respect to the imbalance of these 
standard items on their two sides of their balance sheet. 
 
4.2. The business models identified 
 
 
Figures 2 and 3 present the “median” balance sheet composition of banks in each cluster allowing a 
better understanding of the composition of activities which characterise the identified business 
models. To provide intuition we name the business models as follows: 
1. Wholesale funded banks are generally large banks, their asset side consists mostly of loans 
(second only to traditional commercial banks, see below), they rely much more than other types of 
banks on debt for their funding and less on household deposits (see Figure 3). These banks are 
characterised by far the largest use of derivatives, both for hedging and trading. This cluster contains 
the lowest number of banks: in total, 58 banks belong to this category. 
2. Securities holding banks hold a relatively large securities portfolio and cash buffer, fund 
themselves with deposits and do not use derivatives much. This business model holds the higher 
amount of cash, mainly to be able to carry out its trading activities.  This business model grants the 
lowest amount of loans (see Figure 2). The liability side of the securities holding banks looks pretty 
                                                     
10 Specifically the singular values for three factors were 17.3, 3.7 and 0.4 while for the two factor case they were equal 
to 16.0 and 3. 
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‘traditional’ with a significant amount of deposits.11  They are usually small, but this cluster is the 
most heterogeneous one as 
regards their size. The number of banks which follow this model is 86. 
 
3. Traditional commercial banks are medium-sized, have loans on their asset side more from all 
other banks (see Figure 2). These banks fund themselves more with deposits compared to all other 
business models (see Figure 3) and use derivatives primarily for hedging. They represent the textbook 
prototype of banks as financial intermediaries.  The number of banks contained in this cluster is 77. 
4. Complex commercial banks are medium sized, possess a significant percentage of loans on 
their asset side but lower compared to traditional commercial banks because they also own securities 
to a larger extent, fund themselves mostly with deposits (but less than traditional commercial banks) 
and use derivatives mostly for trading purposes. This is a hybrid category, between traditional 
commercial and wholesale funded banks. It is the largest cluster and includes 108 banks.12 
The numbers of banks that are classified in the various categories can be compared with those of 
RTT and Ayadi et al. (2015). RTT classify most out of the 67 European banks contained in their 
sample as “retail” with “wholesale funded” following and with “trading” banks representing the 
lowest number. Our results are in accordance with those of RTT when it comes to retail banks 
representing the majority of the banking population. There is however a discrepancy with respect to 
the relative numbers of “wholesale funded” and “securities holding” (“trading”) banks, given that in 
our case  the securities holding banks are more than the wholesale funded. This result could be driven 
by our extra category, namely the complex commercial banks which may include some banks that in 
RTT could have been labelled as wholesale funded. It may also be due to our larger sample that 
contains smaller banks that follow the “securities holding” business model. Our results are consistent 
with those of Ayadi et al. (2015) where retail banks are the majority followed by “investment” banks 
and with “wholesale” banks representing the minority. Given that the sample of Ayadi et al. is the 
largest from those compared here (with 2,542 banks from the EEA and Switzerland), it seems 
plausible that our results are somewhere between those of RTT who consider a small sample and 
Ayadi et al. in the sense that the importance of securities holding banks seems to increase as the 
sample gradually becomes larger. There is also a clear correspondence of our business models to 
                                                     
11 Therefore, it is clear that the two types which sometimes are lumped together as ‘investment banks’, namely the 
securities holding banks and the wholesale funded ones should be distinguished because their activities differ 
substantially. 
12 We have preferred to label this business model as “complex” rather than “diversified”, as the latter label would imply 
that they are safer against risks. On the other hand, both names refer to the variety of the activities in which these banks 
are engaged to. The characterisation “universal” could also be fitting for this class of banks. 
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those identified by Hryckiewicz and Kozlowski (2017). 
 
Figure 2. “Median” asset composition per business model. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. “Median” liabilities composition per business model. 
 
 
Figure 4 presents a graphical illustration of the positions of all banks and clusters in the factor space 
while Figure 5 also includes the outlier category in order to show the position of outliers compared 
to the other classified banks. In addition, we report the centroids of the various clusters in the factor 
space below the Table. 
Looking at the relative positions in the x-axis (level factor), the wholesale funded banks are clearly 
located leftwards compared to all other categories. Both types of commercial banks occupy 
approximately the same range across the x-axis while the securities holding banks are located on the 
right of all other types. This relative positioning conforms to the composition of the level factor as 
explained above. In particular, while both commercial banks and wholesale funded contain similar 
amounts of loans, deposits and issued debt, they differ with respect to the use of derivatives (higher 
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for wholesale funded banks)13
 
and this places the latter at the left end. On the other hand, the securities 
holding banks are at the right end of the x-axis given the large presence of trading assets and the 
relatively low presence of loans which lead to low absolute values for the Level factor. 
Figure 4. Location of banks and clusters in the two-dimensional factor space. In the table below the graph, the coordinates of the 
centroids position in the factor space is presented. 
 
Centroids of clusters in the factor space 
 
 Level factor Contrast factor 
1. Whol. funded -1.07 -0.13 
2. Sec. holding -0.64 -0.04 
3. Trad. comm. -0.82 -0.08 
4. Complex comm. -0.96 -0.16 
 
 
With regard to the relative positions in the y-axis (contrast factor), it is interesting to note that the 
traditional commercial banks are located higher than the complex commercial ones, due to the more 
pronounced presence of loans on their asset side (loans enter with a positive sign in the contrast 
factor). On the other hand, wholesale funded banks occupy a wide range of positions with respect to 
the y-axis, reflecting varying contrasts between loans and standard liabilities. A seemingly counter-
intuitive observation is the high contrast values exhibited by the securities holding banks, despite 
                                                     
13 Specifically, the median carrying amount of hedge accounting derivatives on the asset side of the “wholesale-funded” 
cluster is 1.05% of the total assets while this number is less than 0.25% for the remaining clusters. The carrying amount 
of derivatives in the “Held for trading” portfolio is 0.96% for the “wholesale-funded” cluster while it is less than 0.57% 
for the remaining clusters. 
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their relatively small percentage of loans (due to higher levels of trading assets and cash). This is 
explained when one considers their liability side which also includes a lower level of ‘standard’ 
liabilities compared to other types of banks. Specifically, the category “other liabilities” (besides 
deposits, debt and derivatives) is noticeably higher for securities holding banks. The trading activities 
are reflected in the high percentage values of this item comprising e.g. amounts payable in respect 
of future settlements of transactions in securities or foreign exchange transactions.14 
Figure 5 provides a validation for the outlier component by showing the position of the outliers in 
the two-factor space. It is clear that the large majority of detected outliers are located distinctively 
apart from the other classified banks. Further insight into the composition of the outlier set can be 
gained by examining the initial classification of the banks which end up in the outlier set, before the 
outlier detection algorithm is applied. Specifically, the outlier banks set is composed of 18 banks 
which were initially characterised as securities holding banks, 13 banks which were initially 
characterised as wholesale funded banks, and 5 banks which were initially characterised as complex 
commercial banks. No bank from the traditional commercial banks category was reallocated as an 
outlier. Therefore, consistently with the qualitative observations above, mainly banks which depart 
from the standard model of a commercial bank were reclassified into the outlier category. 
A closer examination of the set of ‘outlier’ banks reveals that it includes primarily small investment 
banks and specialised lenders. For example, we find in this set some local government funding 
agencies, specialising in providing financing for (semi-)publicly owned organizations and institutions 
refinancing loans to local public sector entities. Also included are some specialised subsidiaries of 
larger groups, a bank in a run-down mode and central clearing counterparties. Overall, included in 
this group are banks following clearly idiosyncratic business models. 
  
                                                     
14 Fair valued financial commitments and guarantees are also included under this item – according to anecdotal evidence, 
such “other liabilities” is relatively more important for the other categories of banks, however this further decomposition 
is not readily available. 
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Figure 5. Location of banks and clusters in the two-dimensional factor space, including outliers. 
 
 
5. Business models and credit risk 
 
 
In this section, we investigate the credit risk present in the loan portfolios of the previously identified 
business models. We focus on two measures of ex post credit risk and condition on country-specific 
and bank-specific determinants aiming to investigate the additional explanatory power of the business 
model choice. The first measure of credit risk used is the default rate which is almost identical to the 
non-performing loan rate as used in the aforementioned studies. The default rate is a prudential 
measure which is defined in a harmonised way across eurozone banks  based on the pan-European 
Capital Requirements   Regulation (commonly known as the CRR).15 
Furthermore and to enhance the robustness of our analysis, we use the alternative measure of net 
realised credit risk, which is the ratio of impaired and past due loans to total loans, but subtracting 
the provisions already accumulated by the bank both in the numerator and the denominator. In this 
sense, the second metric possesses also a forward looking component as it represents credit risk which 
                                                     
15 We have preferred to use the default rate compared to non-performing rate as the definition has been harmonised across 
European countries for longer, meaning that harmonisation across countries could be more aligned. However, our results 
remain qualitatively similar when the non-performing loans ratio is used. This set of results is available upon request. 
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has not been covered by provisions and may hit banks’ capital directly. Our test hypothesis is that 
the business model choice is linked to the credit risk of the bank. 
H1(i): Banks following business model i exhibit differential credit risk compared to the banks that do 
not follow business model i. 
This formulation nests four hypotheses, one for each of the identified business models. At this point, 
we remain agnostic whether each model 𝑖, with 𝑖 = 1, … ,4  corresponding to the four identified 
business models, exhibits higher or lower performance. Instead we focus on investigating whether 
there is evidence simply for differential performance, a hypothesis which can be explained via the 
mobility barriers concept of the strategic groups literature (e.g. as in Portes 1979 and the literature 
which followed). Given our aim to test for the existence of differential performance characteristics, 
we run four separate regressions, one for each business model, and include each time a dummy 
variable for a specific business model. 
 
5.1. OLS and fixed effects models 
 
We perform two baseline estimations: one with country fixed effects and country-level clustering of 
the error terms and the second with OLS and country-level clustering of residuals. The results of 
these baseline estimations are subjected below to additional robustness checks. Specifically, the 
model estimated with OLS and assuming country level clustering of residuals is the following: 
 𝑦𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑍𝑘(𝑗),𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑋𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝑐𝐼𝑁𝐷(𝑖)𝑗,𝑡−1, +𝑒𝑗,𝑡      (5) 
where the index 𝑗 spans the different banks in our sample (𝑗 = 1, … ,365), 𝑘 spans the countries in 
the sample (𝑘 = 1, … ,19), 𝑘(𝑗) is a function which maps each bank j to the country in which it is 
operating, 𝑦𝑗 represents the dependent variable measuring credit risk, 𝑍𝑘 is a vector of country-level 
variables for the country in which bank j is operating, 𝑋𝑗 is a vector of conditional bank-specific 
variables, 𝐼𝑁𝐷(𝑖) is an indicator variable that shows whether bank 𝑗 has been classified as following 
the business model 𝑖16, 𝑎1 and 𝛽 are vectors of coefficients and c a coefficient. Time t refers to end-
2015 data and t-1 to end-2014 data. Finally, 𝑒𝑗,𝑡 represents the residual term. The clustering of 
residuals across countries means that we assume 
𝐸[𝑒𝑗,𝑡𝑒𝑗∗,𝑡|𝑋𝑗,𝑡−1, 𝑋𝑗∗,𝑡−1] = 0, except if 𝑘(𝑗) = 𝑘(𝑗
∗). 
                                                     
16 One dummy is included each time the model is estimated, therefore the coefficient for each business model quantifies 
the average statistical difference of the effect for the banks following this specific business model when compared to the 
banks following the three remaining ones. 
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The coefficient of interest 𝑐, is the estimated effect of the business model 𝑖 on bank’s credit risk. For 
example, a positive coefficient ?̂? means that the banks following the business model 𝑖 present on 
average higher credit risk compared to all the other banks. 
The corresponding model with country fixed effects and country-level clustering of the error terms 
includes a separate intercept for each country and can be written as 
𝑦𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑎0,𝑘(𝑗) + 𝛽𝑋𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝑐𝐼𝑁𝐷(𝑖)𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑗,𝑡      (6)  
The same condition as in the case of the model estimated with OLS applies for the residual term 𝑒𝑗,𝑡. 
We follow the expanding literature on banks’ credit risk determinants that utilises both 
macroeconomic and bank-specific variables. Our list of bank-specific variables is consistent with the 
specifications followed e.g. in Berger and DeYoung (1997), Louzis et al. (2012) and Nkusu (2011) 
where the determinants of non-performing loans in advanced economies are investigated. In addition, 
our specification is broadly consistent with the bank diversification and profitability strands of the 
literature (Albertazzi and Gambacorta 2009; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 1999; Elsas et al., 2010; 
Laeven and Levine 2007) which is related to our investigation. The bank traits which serve as 
conditional variables include the size of the bank, the ratio of deposits to liabilities to control for the 
funding structure of the bank, the leverage ratio (equity-to-assets), past growth of assets and income 
and its market share within its country. In order to avoid that outliers drive our results, we winsorise 
all used variables at the 5% level. 
Some bank-specific variables that we use are also inputs to the classification of banks in business 
models. Therefore, we examine the multicollinearity of our baseline model variables by checking the 
VIF values and in all cases they are less than 1.1 meaning that multicollinearity can be safely 
ignored.17 The absence of significant multicollinearity effects can be attributed to the multi-
dimensional nature of our business model classification methodology. However, multicollinearity 
would represent an issue for the business  model  classifications  that  are  based  on  a  small  number  
of pre-selected dimensions.18
  
Therefore, due to our granular approach to business model  
classification we are able to control for such bank-specific variables which may differ within business 
models and whose omission may have led to omitted variable biases. 
The first set of conditional variables takes into account scale effects which may impact the dependent 
credit risk variables. This set includes bank’s size (following e.g., Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Laeven 
                                                     
17 These results are available upon request. 
18 For example, Hryckiewicz and Kozlowski (2017) do not include in their regression variables that are used for the 
clustering of banks. 
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and Levine, 2007), which could affect risk through too-big-to-fail (henceforth TBTF) effects (e.g. as 
in Boyd and Gertler, 1994; Ennis and Malek, 2005; Freixas and Rochet, 2013) or the existence of 
(dis)economies of scale. Additionally, we include variables measuring banks’ growth of assets 
and operating income (e.g. as in Louzis et al., 2012; Ghosh, 2015).19 Therefore, we condition both 
on cross-sectional and dynamic scale variables (Elsas et al., 2010). In this way one can discriminate 
between indirect size effects and direct effects due to expansion (‘foot-in- the-door’ strategy). 
Furthermore, we control for bank’s funding composition and include the ratio of deposits to assets. 
Köhler (2015) does not find a statistically significant effect from non- deposit funding to banks’ risk, 
however we would like to account for a variable which is typically used as a defining dimension in 
the existing business model literature in order to show that business model choice as defined here 
provides explanatory power over simple dimensions used to distinguish banks’ business models. We 
also control for the level of capitalisation which reflects bank’s risk for unexpected losses (Berger 
and DeYoung, 1997; Wheelock and Wilson, 2012). A weakly-capitalized bank would have stronger 
incentives to engage in higher risk activities that promise higher return. 
Finally, it has been argued that the competition that each bank faces within its jurisdiction may have 
effects on its governance and efficiency (as for example in Berger and Mester, 2003) and 
subsequently on the risk of its portfolio. Therefore, we include the market share that each bank 
represents with respect to the total consolidated assets of the other banks that operate in the same 
jurisdiction as an explanatory variable.20 
In all cases we use observations of the outcome variables for end-2015 i.e. one year after the reference 
date of the dataset used to identify the business models. In this way, potential endogeneity issues with 
respect both to the definition of the business model and the bank-specific determinants can be 
addressed. We also conduct a number of robustness checks of our results below, also utilising 
instrumental variables estimation to address potential endogeneity biases with respect to the business 
model variable. 
Specifically, in the baseline model we mitigate for the potential endogeneity of the bank-specific 
variables by using year-long time lags. This also applies to the business model variable, which is 
based on end-2014 data i.e. precedes the outcome variables by one year. The theoretical justification 
which underlies our choice of variables aims also to address endogeneity caused by omitted variables. 
                                                     
19 Due to data limitations we cannot go further back in time beyond yearly growth. However, we expect that the long-
run bank’s expansion would be correlated with the long-run changes in macroeconomic conditions for which we have 
conditioned already for a multi-year horizon, taking into account the developments during the crisis. 
20 As reported in the Consolidated Banking Statistics of the ECB: 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/supervisory_prudential_statistics/consolidated_banking_data/html/index.  en.html . 
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In the baseline regressions we treat the lagged business model variable as exogenous, which can be 
justified by the argument that one would expect that the business model is a feature which is constant 
in the medium term e.g. in the course of one year, and therefore there is no reverse causation 
stemming from the outcome variable. However, migration of banks across business models cannot 
be excluded and consequently concerns of endogeneity. Therefore, we investigate below the 
robustness of our results to endogeneity concerns regarding the business model classification. 
In the specification estimated with OLS we include country specific variables such as GDP and 
unemployment measures in order to capture the effects of the macroeconomic environment in 
different time horizons.21
 
Concretely, macroeconomic conditions are taken into account by including 
the y-o-y real GDP growth and the 2009-2015 change in unemployment, so as to capture both short-
run macroeconomic effects and the long-run effects of the crisis.22
 
When country fixed effects are 
used, additional country level effects can be captured e.g. the impact of national macro-prudential 
measures that could affect banks’ risk (Altunbas et al., 2018). 
 
5.2. Controlling for endogeneity 
 
We conduct two additional robustness checks based on alternative estimation methods.23
 
The first  
aims to address endogeneity concerns with respect to the business model indicator. So far the 
assumption has been made that business models affect outcome variables but not vice versa while, in 
addition, we assume that there are no omitted characteristics which determine both  the  performance  
variables  and banks’ business models. The lag structure does not necessarily address such potential 
biases, given that the business model is a semi-stable characteristic for each bank, which may evolve 
throughout time even though only gradually. In addition, there could be unobserved features at the 
bank level, e.g. the quality of governance of an institution, that affect credit risk. This potential 
problem of endogeneity could be solved by using an instrument for bank’s business models that 
would be a predictor of bank’s business model but without having a direct effect on credit risk. Such 
instrument would proxy for the unobserved institutional features of a country that would affect the 
banks’ choice of a business model e.g. with respect to the role of a country as a financial hub, past 
                                                     
21 All country specific variables which are used, including those for the robustness checks, are explained  in more detail 
in Appendix E. 
22 The results are qualitatively similar when we interchange the use of long-run and short-run measures  for GDP and 
unemployment or when inflation is also included. 
23 An additional robustness check was to include efficiency as an explanatory variable, consistently with the  ‘bad  
management’  and  ‘skimping’  hypotheses  of  Berger  and  DeYoung  (1997).  The results are qualitatively similar while 
the statistical significance of the business model variable remains. These results are available upon request. 
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regulatory interventions24, propensity of households to take mortgage loans25, and would affect credit 
risk only via this channel and not directly (see Angrist and Pischke 2009). 
We proxy these unknown institutional features that determine banks’ business model at the country 
level by the share of each business model within the subsample of banks of that country.26 This 
instrumental variable is highly correlated to each bank’s business model indicator however it can be 
plausibly argued that it is not a direct determinant of the credit risk to which each bank is exposed as 
it proxies for country level institutional factors while credit risk is mainly determined by 
macroeconomic and bank-specific determinants (see Louzis et al. 2012; Klein 2013). It can be also 
plausibly assumed that the share of banks following a specific business model in a country should be 
unrelated to unobserved features at the bank level e.g. the quality of governance of an institution. 
Consequently, the only reason for the relationship between the share of banks in a country that follow 
a specific business model and a bank’s credit risk is the relationship between the share of banks 
variable and the bank’s business model variable. Specifically, let 𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸(𝑖)𝑘,𝑡−1 denote the 
percentage of banks following business model 𝑖 in country 𝑘 in end-2014. The exclusion restriction 
is that 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸(𝑖)𝑘,𝑡−1, 𝑒𝑗,𝑡 ) = 0 while the data show also that the variable 𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸(𝑖)𝑘,𝑡−1 is a 
strong predictor of 𝐼𝑁𝐷(𝑖)𝑡−1
27, therefore it represents a valid instrument in our setting.  
In addition, we also perform, as an additional robustness check, a backward stepwise regression 
approach, a methodological choice followed also in Aebi et al. 2012.28
 
Specifically, we use backward 
stepwise regression with 20% significance level for removal from and 10% for addition to the model, 
with clustering of residuals at the country level. 
 
5.3. Results 
 
The regression results are presented in Tables 1 and 2 for the OLS and country fixed effects 
specifications, for realised credit risk and default rate, respectively. Furthermore, in Tables 3 and 4 
the results of the robustness checks using instrumental variables and stepwise regression are shown 
                                                     
24 It must be mentioned that our sample date (end-2014) corresponds to the initiation of the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism which encompasses all countries in our sample, so all banks are under the same regulatory regime. However 
still there could be regulatory interventions of the past which may have shaped banks’ selection of business models. 
25 This analysis of potential endogeneity is at this stage simply a robustness check as there is no available literature on 
the determinants of banks’ business models. 
26 We refer here to the institutional factors influencing the largest banks’ business model in each country, as our sample 
comprises of the largest institutions. 
27 We have performed the F-statistics for the instrumental variables, which show that our chosen instrument is quite 
strong (in the sense of being correlated with the potentially endogenous business model variable). These results are 
available upon request.  
28 The literature has expressed criticism against the stepwise regression approach when it is used as a primary method 
for selecting variables (e.g. Judd and McClelland 2008). Our use here is intended purely as a robustness check. 
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for realised credit risk and default rate, respectively. As expected, the unemployment rate is a 
statistically significant driver of credit risk, consistently with Nkusu (2011), Louzis et al. (2012) and 
Anastasiou et al. (2016) among others. In addition, as regards the bank-specific variables, there is 
evidence that asset and income growth are negatively associated with credit risk, meaning that banks 
which are able to expand exhibit also lower levels of credit risk. This is in contrast to other studies 
which use data spanning a period including the peak of the most recent financial crisis (e.g. Klein 
2013) and may be related to the capacity of the banks which were able to withstand the most intense 
period of the crisis to extend credit while being also exposed to lower credit risk. This is similar to 
results which utilise data only from the pre-crisis period e.g. Quagliariello (2007). 
Turning to the business model indicator variable, a consistently statistically significant coefficient is 
estimated for the securities holding banks and the traditional commercial banks. First, securities 
holding banks seem to be characterised by higher credit risk in their loan portfolio compared to the 
rest of the banks, both with respect to realised credit risk and the default rate. This would seem to be 
consistent with an interpretation based on the specialisation of these banks, namely that because loan 
granting represents a relatively less significant component of their assets, as is seen in Figure 2, they 
are less well placed to monitor effectively credit risk. This result is also consistent with the finding 
regarding the elevated capital levels held by this cluster of banks and the need to hold capital buffers 
for potential losses. 
Second, the traditional commercial banks are found to be exposed less to credit risk compared to the 
other banks. These banks exemplify the standard intermediation function, as in the seminal 
contribution of Ho and Sanders (1981), and can be seen to stand in contrast to the securities holding 
banks, which deviate significantly from the traditional form of banking intermediation. Therefore, it 
is intuitive that these traditional ‘boring’ institutions exhibit relatively low levels of loan portfolio 
credit risk, in contrast to banks for which loan granting is less pronounced compared to market 
activities. 
It is also interesting that size variables, like total assets and market share are not found statistically 
significant with the same consistency as the business model indicators for securities holding and 
traditional commercial banks. Our results hint to the fact that business models may be statistically 
more robust determinants for credit risk compared to size indicators, which is supportive of the 
practice of distinguishing the different types of banks when analysing their credit risk as, for example, 
in Ghosh (2015). This practice is common already in the analyses of market practitioners (e.g. SNL 
2013, KPMG 2016) and regulators e.g. in the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) 
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followed in the eurozone (ECB 2016) and the Federal Reserve (Carlson et al., 2017).29  
                                                     
29 We have also checked the relation of market based measures of risk with business model at the level of descriptive 
statistics, due to the lack of data. Specifically, when using the CDS spreads we find significantly higher values for the 
complex commercial banks. However, the sample of banks for which CDS are available is not enough for an 
econometric investigation (36 out of 365 banks). 
Furthermore, it has been argued that market-based measures of credit risk, like SRISK, are useful to measure risk in 
states of the world where all equity is wiped out and subsequently balance sheet measures is more suitable to quantify 
potential credit risk losses (Homar et al. 2016). The comparison of market based and balance sheet based measures of 
risk would be however an interesting topic for further research. 
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Table 1 
The dependent variable is realised credit risk, defined as impaired loans minus their specific provisions as a percentage of total loans, as observed in 2015. Real GDP growth is the y-o-y growth in 
end-2015. Unemployment change is the 6-year change in unemployment until end-2015. The rest of the bank-specific variables are as observed on end-2014 except from the growth rates which refer 
to yearly rates by end-2015. Log (total assets) refers to the logarithm of bank’s total assets. Deposits/liabilities is the ratio of deposits to liabilities. Equity/assets is the ratio of equity to assets. Growth 
in assets is the yearly growth rate in total assets, from 2014Q4 to 2015Q4. Growth in income is the yearly growth rate in operating income. Market share is the bank’s share in total assets in the 
country. The business model dummy is one if the bank belongs to the respective business model indicated by the column label. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Dependent  variable: Realised credit risk 
 Wholesale funded banks (Cluster 1) Securities holding 
(Cluster 2) 
Traditional commercial 
(Cluster 3) 
Complex commercial 
(Cluster 4) 
 OLS Country fixed effects OLS Country fixed effects OLS Country fixed effects OLS Country fixed 
effects 
GDP growth -0.482 
(0.79) 
 -0.569 
(0.97) 
 -0.580 
(1.03) 
 -0.320 
(0.52) 
 
Unemployment 
change 
0.772* 
(1.94) 
 0.763* 
(2.01) 
 0.773** 
(2.22) 
 0.791* 
(2.09) 
 
Log (total assets) 0.024 
(1.66) 
0.038 
(1.54) 
0.026* 
(2.18) 
0.036* 
(1.69) 
0.022 
(1.61) 
0.032 
(1.49) 
0.019 
(1.25) 
0.030 
(1.39) 
Deposits/liabilities 0.449** 
(2.31) 
0.577 
(1.84)* 
0.455** 
(2.39) 
0.577* 
(1.83) 
0.480** 
(2.50) 
0.602* 
(1.84) 
0.455** 
(2.27) 
0.580* 
(1.78) 
Equity/assets -0.504 
(0.89) 
-0.343 
(0.73) 
-0.448 
(0.78) 
-0.307 
(0.62) 
-0.453 
(0.82) 
-0.306 
(0.62) 
-0.566 
(1.02) 
-0.395 
(0.86) 
Growth in assets -0.527* 
(2.18) 
-0.701 
(2.13)** 
-0.601** 
(2.57) 
-0.765** 
(2.37) 
-0.618** 
(2.27) 
-0.775** 
(2.08) 
-0.513* 
(2.06) 
-0.695** 
(2.21) 
Growth in income -0.076* 
(2.04) 
-0.060* 
(1.77) 
-0.079* 
(2.08) 
-0.062* 
(1.75) 
-0.072* 
(1.88) 
-0.055 
(1.62) 
-0.072* 
(2.05) 
-0.054* 
(1.77) 
Market share -0.329 
(1.09) 
-0.340 
(1.11) 
-0.280 
(0.94) 
-0.267 
(0.98) 
-0.288 
(0.96) 
-0.270 
(0.97) 
-0.357 
(1.09) 
-0.360 
(1.14) 
Business model 
dummy 
-0.033 
(0.83) 
-0.063 
(1.27) 
0.041* 
(1.75) 
0.042** 
(2.04) 
-0.042* 
(1.73) 
-0.035* 
(1.90) 
0.046 
(1.05) 
0.063 
(1.09) 
Constant -0.800* 
(1.81) 
-1.193 
(1.55) 
-0.863** 
(2.40) 
-1.178* 
(1.69) 
-0.749* 
(1.85) 
-1.076 
(1.53) 
-0.696 
(1.50) 
-1.022 
(1.44) 
Observations 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 
R-squared 0.34 0.27 0.34 0.28 0.34 0.28 0.34 0.28 
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Table 2 
The dependent variable is the default rate, defined as the ratio of defaulted loans to total loans, as observed in 2015. Real GDP growth is the y-o-y growth in end-2015. Unemployment change is 
the 6-year change in unemployment until end-2015. The rest of the bank-specific variables are as observed on end-2014 except from the growth rates which refer to yearly rates by end-2015. Log 
(total assets) refers to the logarithm of bank’s total assets. Deposits/liabilities is the ratio of deposits to liabilities. Equity/assets is the ratio of equity to assets. Growth in assets is the yearly growth 
rate in total assets, from 2014Q4 to 2015Q4. Growth in income is the yearly growth rate in operating income. Market share is the bank’s share in total assets in the country. The business model 
dummy is one if the bank belongs to the respective business model indicated by the column label. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Dependent  variable: Default rate 
 Wholesale funded banks (Cluster 1) Securities holding 
(Cluster 2) 
Traditional commercial 
(Cluster 3) 
Complex commercial 
(Cluster 4) 
 OLS Country fixed 
effects 
OLS Country fixed 
effects 
OLS Country fixed 
effects 
OLS Country fixed 
effects 
GDP growth -0.020 
(0.05) 
 0.117 
(0.28) 
 -0.028 
(0.08) 
 -0.041 
(0.10) 
 
Unemployment 
change 
0.739** 
(2.53) 
 0.793** 
(2.65) 
 0.735** 
(2.73) 
 0.720** 
(2.39) 
 
Log (total assets) -0.003 
(0.38) 
0.005 
(1.19) 
0.000 
(0.04) 
0.006 
(1.40) 
-0.003 
(0.47) 
0.005 
(1.11) 
-0.003 
(0.46) 
0.005 
(1.16) 
Deposits/liabilities 0.058 
(1.33) 
0.032 
(1.01) 
0.061 
(1.44) 
0.041 
(1.32) 
0.063 
(1.43) 
0.032 
(1.02) 
0.053 
(1.15) 
0.031 
(0.98) 
Equity/assets -0.002 
(0.02) 
0.026 
(0.31) 
-0.052 
(0.55) 
-0.007 
(0.09) 
-0.018 
(0.20) 
0.023 
(0.28) 
-0.005 
(0.05) 
0.026 
(0.32) 
Growth in assets -0.154** 
(2.92) 
-0.147** 
(2.50) 
-0.172*** 
(3.11) 
-0.145** 
(2.56) 
-0.187*** 
(3.31) 
-0.147** 
(2.51) 
-0.158** 
(2.90) 
-0.145** 
(2.48) 
Growth in income 0.017 
(1.07) 
0.026** 
(2.02) 
0.025 
(1.20) 
0.027** 
(2.19) 
0.020 
(1.33) 
0.026** 
(2.04) 
0.016 
(0.97) 
0.026** 
(2.02) 
Market share 0.169 
(1.46) 
-0.044 
(0.57) 
014 0.147 
(1.28) 
-0.048 
(0.64) 
0.163 
(1.52) 
-0.043 
(0.55) 
0.164 
(1.45) 
-0.045 
(0.59) 
Business model 
dummy 
0.000 
(0.02) 
-0.005 
(0.39) 
0.049* 
(1.73) 
0.027** 
(2.13) 
-0.036** 
(2.16) 
-0.015* 
(1.73) 
0.014 
(0.76) 
-0.000 
(0.02) 
Constant 0.087 
(0.53) 
-0.031 
(0.26) 
0.021 
(0.14) 
-0.055 
(0.48) 
0.108 
(0.74) 
-0.020 
(0.18) 
0.097 
(0.60) 
-0.026 
(0.22) 
Observations 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 
R-squared 0.48  0.52  0.51  0.48  
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Table 3 
The dependent variable is realised credit risk, defined as impaired loans minus their specific provisions as a percentage of total loans, as observed in 2015. Real GDP growth is the y-o-y growth 
in end-2015. Unemployment change is the 6-year change in unemployment until end-2015. The rest of the bank-specific variables are as observed on end-2014 except from the growth rates which 
refer to yearly rates by end-2015. Log (total assets) refers to the logarithm of bank’s total assets. Deposits/liabilities is the ratio of deposits to liabilities. Equity/assets is the ratio of equity to assets. 
Growth in assets is the yearly growth rate in total assets, from 2014Q4 to 2015Q4. Growth in income is the yearly growth rate in operating income. Market share is the bank’s share in total assets 
in the country. The business model dummy is one if the bank belongs to the respective business model indicated by the column label. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. For each business 
model regression, the first column presents results with an instrumental variables estimation while the second column with a backward stepwise approach. 
Dependent variable: Realised credit risk 
Robustness checks 
 Wholesale funded banks (Cluster 1) Securities holding 
(Cluster 2) 
Traditional commercial 
(Cluster 3) 
Complex commercial 
(Cluster 4) 
 IV GMM Stepwise IV GMM Stepwise IV GMM Stepwise IV GMM Stepwise 
GDP growth -0.716 
(0.57) 
 -0.937 
(1.12) 
-1.075* 
(2.18) 
-1.230 
(1.08) 
-1.090** 
(2.24) 
0.343 
(0.29) 
 
Unemployment 
change 
0.664 
(1.30) 
0.931** 
(2.95) 
0.660* 
(1.87) 
0.598* 
(1.85) 
0.637* 
(1.75) 
0.609* 
(2.02) 
0.631 
(1.35) 
0.931** 
(2.95) 
Log (total assets) 0.034 
(0.90) 
 0.036** 
(2.25) 
0.029** 
(2.78) 
0.023 
(1.57) 
0.023** 
(2.22) 
0.005 
(0.19) 
 
Deposits/liabilities 0.432*** 
(2.70) 
0.285* 
(1.88) 
0.455** 
(2.55) 
0.467** 
(2.26) 
0.569*** 
(3.05) 
0.496** 
(2.37) 
0.458* 
(1.82) 
0.285* 
(1.88) 
Equity/assets -0.496 
(1.13) 
-0.876 
(1.58) 
-0.321 
(0.61) 
 -0.261 
(0.49) 
 -1.068 
(1.31) 
-0.876 
(1.58) 
Growth in assets -0.530* 
(1.83) 
-0.325 
(1.37) 
-0.764*** 
(2.70) 
-0.633** 
(2.40) 
-0.949*** 
(3.23) 
-0.647* 
(2.17) 
-0.406 
(1.14) 
-0.325 
(1.37) 
Growth in income -0.078* 
(1.88) 
-0.064 
(1.76) 
-0.086 
(1.97)** 
-0.072* 
(2.02) 
-0.062 
(1.38) 
-0.064* 
(1.81) 
-0.049 
(0.94) 
-0.064 
(1.76) 
Market share -0.411 
(0.85) 
 -0.236 
(0.81) 
 -0.243 
(0.71) 
 -0.831 
(1.51) 
 
Business model 
dummy 
-0.127 
(0.38) 
 0.130* 
(1.71) 
0.052** 
(2.74) 
-0.192** 
(2.05) 
-0.050** 
(2.22) 
0.437 
(1.32) 
 
Constant -0.974 
(1.20) 
-0.114 
(0.99) 
-1.131** 
(2.30) 
-0.987** 
(2.61) 
-0.787* 
(1.73) 
-0.841** 
(2.21) 
-0.333 
(0.45) 
-0.114 
(0.99) 
Observations 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 
R-squared 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.24 0.32 0.26 0.32 
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Table 4 
The dependent variable is default rate, defined as the ratio of defaulted loans to total loans, as observed in 2015. Real GDP growth is the y-o-y growth in end-2015. Unemployment change is the 
6-year change in unemployment until end-2015. The rest of the bank-specific variables are as observed on end-2014 except from the growth rates which refer to yearly rates by end-2015. Log 
(total assets) refers to the logarithm of bank’s total assets. Deposits/liabilities is the ratio of deposits to liabilities. Equity/assets is the ratio of equity to assets. Growth in assets is the yearly growth 
rate in total assets, from 2014Q4 to 2015Q4. Growth in income is the yearly growth rate in operating income. Market share is the bank’s share in total assets in the country. The business model 
dummy is one if the bank belongs to the respective business model indicated by the column label. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. For each business model regression, the first column 
presents results with an instrumental variables estimation while the second column with a backward stepwise approach. 
 
Dependent variable: Default rate 
Robustness checks 
 Wholesale funded banks (Cluster 1) Securities holding 
(Cluster 2) 
Traditional commercial 
(Cluster 3) 
Complex commercial 
(Cluster 4) 
 IV GMM Stepwise IV GMM Stepwise IV GMM Stepwise IV GMM Stepwise 
GDP growth -0.044 
(0.13) 
 0.057 
(0.18) 
 -0.054 
(0.10) 
 -0.359 
(0.55) 
 
Unemployment 
change 
0.731*** 
(4.85) 
0.741** 
(2.76) 
0.769*** 
(4.81) 
0.784** 
(2.88) 
0.722*** 
(5.58) 
0.738*** 
(2.99) 
0.421* 
(1.80) 
0.741** 
(2.76) 
Log (total assets) -0.002 
(0.33) 
 -0.001 
(0.28) 
 -0.004 
(0.87) 
 -0.011 
(1.47) 
 
Deposits/liabilities 0.056* 
(1.74) 
0.071 
(1.46) 
0.060** 
(2.15) 
0.061 
(1.50) 
0.080* 
(1.70) 
0.077 
(1.65) 
-0.019 
(0.34) 
0.071 
(1.46) 
Equity/assets -0.008 
(0.09) 
 -0.030 
(0.32) 
 -0.074 
(0.69) 
 -0.050 
(0.31) 
 
Growth in assets -0.157** 
(2.41) 
-0.109* 
(1.99) 
-0.164** 
(2.39) 
-0.118* 
(1.93) 
-0.301*** 
(3.09) 
-0.135* 
(2.11) 
-0.218** 
(2.07) 
-0.109* 
(1.99) 
Growth in income 0.018 
(0.98) 
 0.021 
(1.02) 
 0.031 
(1.24) 
 -0.011 
(0.37) 
 
Market share 0.161 
(1.75)* 
0.132 
(1.58) 
0.156** 
(2.04) 
0.145 
(1.68) 
0.144 
(1.43) 
0.123 
(1.43) 
0.097 
(0.61) 
0.132 
(1.58) 
Business model 
dummy 
-0.015 
(0.17) 
 0.028* 
(1.77) 
0.043* 
(1.80) 
-0.160*** 
(3.91) 
-0.035** 
(2.19) 
0.232*** 
(2.90) 
 
Constant 0.074 
(0.65) 
-0.005 
(0.15) 
0.050 
(0.51) 
-0.008 
(0.21) 
0.181 
(1.30) 
0.002 
(0.05) 
0.257 
(1.33) 
-0.005 
(0.15) 
Observations 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 
R-squared 0.48 0.47 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.49 0.47 
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6. Conclusion 
 
We present the first study that makes use of an exceptionally granular data set on European 
banks in order to infer the types of existing business models. We have adopted a data driven 
clustering approach which combines optimally the classification of banks with data reduction, 
enhanced with an ‘outlier’ banks detection component in order to avoid the ‘contamination’ of 
the derived clusters with very specialised institutions. Our approach minimises the impact of 
the researcher’s priors on the results while taking into account the full range of banks’ activities 
and avoiding misclassifications due to the use of a narrow set of balance sheet ratios. 
The results provide an anatomy of the Euro area banking sector and indicate the co- existence 
of distinct business models. We label the four business models identified by our method as 
“traditional commercial”, “complex commercial”, “wholesale funded” and “securities holding” 
banks. Specialised institutions such as state owned entities aimed at refinancing loans to semi-
public and public entities, central clearing counterparties or banks in a run-down mode, are 
identified as outliers by the clustering algorithm. 
The statistical analysis identifies two main factors as the most efficient composite variables to 
discriminate banks: a level factor representing the presence of “standard” asset and liability 
items, with the notable exception of trading assets, and a contrast factor which represents the 
imbalance in the presence of loans on the asset side compared to “standard liabilities” with the 
latter including deposits and issued debt. These factors represent banks’ activities and are robust 
to the presence of the various forms through which these activities are reflected in the bank’s 
balance sheet e.g. whether a bank provides credit to non-financial corporations via regular loans 
or credit lines. 
Moreover, our econometric investigation provides empirical evidence of a relationship between 
credit risk in the loan portfolio and the choice of the business model. We find that traditional 
commercial banks present significantly lower credit risk compared to the other business models. 
In addition, securities holding banks are characterized by higher levels of credit risk. These 
results prove to be largely robust to alternative specifications and when controlling for the 
endogeneity of the business model.  
Our results reflect the history of macroeconomic developments and policy decisions which have 
taken place during the crisis period while dynamic effects may also be important e.g. like 
migration of banks towards different business models, and should be further investigated. For 
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example, both the ECB Financial Stability Review (ECB 2015) and the IMF Global Financial 
Stability Report (IMF 2015) point to structural business model changes in the aftermath of the 
global financial crisis, in a context characterised by low inflation, weak profitability and large, 
albeit heterogeneously distributed, non-performing loans. 
These results are highly relevant for monetary policy, micro-prudential banking supervision 
and the design of macro-prudential policy. Specifically, asymmetries in the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism across countries, as identified for example by Barigozzi et al. (2014), 
could be also partly explained by the prevalence of different banks’ business models in single 
countries. Empirical research points to the significance that should be attached to the 
heterogeneity of banks’ business models when designing micro-prudential supervision 
(Blundell-Wignall et al., 2014) and this is already reflected in the supervision process in many 
jurisdictions (e.g. see ECB, 2016). Furthermore, the paper has provided evidence that business 
models represent determinants of credit risk, which is especially relevant for banking 
supervision. It would be of great interest to investigate a possible link between business models 
and measures of systemic risk that would inform also the calibration of structural macro-
prudential capital tools e.g. the systemic risk buffer (SRB) or the other systemically important 
institutions (O-SII) buffer. Finally, it would be of great interest to investigate whether the 
business models aspect could shed light on the relationship between competition and risk-taking 
in banking (Boyd and De Nicolò, 2005) e.g. by influencing the correlation structure of losses 
(as for example Hakenes  and Schnabel, 2011). 
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Appendix 
A – FINREP templates used as input set 
Table A-1 presents the templates which are used as the input set along with the number of 
variables from each template. The EBA templates along with the definitions of the contained 
data can be found at the EBA website: https://www.eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-
policy/supervisory-reporting.  
Table A-1: Contents of the templates defining the input set 
Template code  
(as defined by the EBA) 
Contents 
F 01.01 Assets 
F 04.01 Assets held for trading 
F 04.02 Assets designated at fair value 
through profit or loss 
F 04.03 Available-for-sale assets 
(carrying amount) 
F 04.04 Loans and receivables & held-to-
maturity assets 
F 05.00 Loans and advances by product 
(on demand, credit card, leases, 
loans etc) 
F 08.01.a Liabilities 
F 09.01 Off-balance items (loan 
commitments and guarantees) 
F 10.00 Derivatives – trading 
F 11.01 Derivatives – hedge accounting 
 
F 01.01 and all F 04 templates provide the breakdown of assets across accounting portfolios, 
with additional breakdowns on instruments and counterparties. F 05 provides the breakdown of 
loans by product (credit card loans, collateralized loans, project finance etc). The liability side 
is covered by the F 08 template, which breaks down liabilities by accounting portfolio (the 
largest percentage of banks’ liabilities are valued at amortised cost), instrument and 
counterparty. Off-balance sheet items, primarily loan commitments and guarantees are 
contained in template F 09.01. Finally, templates F 10 and F 11.01 provide detailed information 
on derivatives, distinguishing between trading and hedge accounting derivatives. The 
information is further broken down by type of derivatives (interest rate, equity, foreign 
exchange, credit and commodity) and by the type of market in which the derivatives are traded 
(OTC or organised markets). 
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B – Input set selection 
The initial set of variables contains a number of highly correlated variables. We would like to 
automatically select the ones which are more “fundamental” in the sense of being more relevant 
for supervisory purposes; for example, when there is a variable like “notional amount of total 
derivatives” and one of its subcategories like “notional amount of OTC derivatives”, we would 
prefer to keep the broader category on the condition that it is more related to the set of the 
remaining variables. This selection of variables is also subject to the condition that we would 
like to exclude pairs of variables with the absolute level of correlations above a threshold, which 
was set to 0.95, in order to avoid bias in the results. 
We define a measure of the “importance” of each variable within the data set in order to 
operationalise the above selection criteria. The “importance” ( )jI  of each variable j  is defined 
as the linear combination of the correlation absolute values with the other variables of the input 
set: 
( ) ( )
=
=
jk
Pk
kjCorrj
#
,,..,1
|,|I  
Consequently, we order the variables in a non-increasing order based on their ( )jI . Whenever 
the predefined level of correlation 
*C is exceeded, then only one of the two correlated variables 
is retained, specifically the one with a higher level of ( )jI .  
This step represents a data preparation step motivated by the nature of our initial dataset and is 
not related to the dimensionality reduction component of the clustering algorithm that we 
employ to derive the banks’ classification into business models. 
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C – Clustering algorithm 
The clustering algorithm which minimises Eq. (4) belongs to the class of Alternated Least 
Squares (ALS) algorithms (Vichi and Kiers, 2001). 
In Step 1, we minimize 𝐹(𝑨, 𝑼, ?̅?) with respect to 𝑼 given the values of 𝑨 and ?̅?. For each row 
𝑖 of 𝑈 we set 𝑈𝑖𝑗 = 1, if 𝐹(𝑨, 𝑈𝑖𝑗) = min {𝐹(𝑨, [𝑈𝑖𝑣]): 𝑣 = 1, … , 𝑚} and 𝑈𝑖𝑗 = 0 otherwise.  
In Step 2, 𝐹(𝑨, 𝑼, ?̅?) is minimized keeping fixed 𝑼, to update jointly 𝑨 and ?̅?. Among all the 
linear combinations of 𝑿, the ones closer to the centroids (in the transformed space) are derived 
by taking the first 𝑚 eigenvectors of 𝑿′(𝑼 (𝑼′𝑼)−𝟏𝑼′ − 𝑰𝒏)𝑿 (see Ten Berge 1993). From the 
optimal 𝑨, we then update ?̅? from the expression ?̅? = (𝑼′𝑼)−𝟏𝑼′𝑿𝑨.  
In Step 3, we compute 𝐹(𝑨, 𝑼, ?̅?) for the current values of 𝑼, 𝑨 and ?̅?. If F has decreased, we 
go again with Step 1 and 2. Otherwise, the process has converged. In the latter case, we keep 
the values of 𝑼, 𝑨 and ?̅?  from the previous iteration. 
The algorithm as described above starts with some given values of 𝑨 and ?̅?. In order to avoid 
being trapped by a local optimum, we have to cover the parameter space. For this reason, a 
procedure for choosing a number of random initial points in a rational way is applied.  
Matrix 𝑨 is initialized in the following way. First, K=100 random permutation matrices 𝑷𝒌, k=
1, … , 𝐾, are generated. The Gram-Schmidt algorithm is applied on each of these matrices, in 
order to make them orthogonal. Our input matrix is the 382 × 382 unbiased sample covariance 
matrix 𝑪 =
1
𝑛−1
𝑿′𝑿. Its spectral decomposition is 𝑽𝒓 𝑫𝒓𝑽𝒓
′, where 𝑽𝒓 is the matrix of 
eigenvectors and  𝑫𝒓 is the matrix of eigenvalues. Thus, we post-multiply the random 
permutation matrix 𝑷𝒌 by 𝑽𝒓. We run this initial procedure for K=100 times obtaining the same 
number of initial estimates 𝑨𝟎,𝒌 = 𝑷𝒌𝑽𝒓 , k= 1, … , 𝐾. 
For each of the 100 random 𝑨𝟎,𝒌, the group matrix 𝑼 is initialised by computing for each bank 
the relevant quantity 𝑡𝑖 = 𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖(𝑪𝑭)
−1𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖
′, 𝑖 = 1, … ,365, where 𝑪𝑭 is the computed 
covariance matrix on the columns of 𝐅𝟎,𝒌 = 𝐗𝑨𝟎,𝒌, and we set 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖 = F0,k,i − F̅0,k  for k=
1, … ,100 (denoting by F0,k,i the i-th row of the matrix F0,𝑘, and by F̅0,k the mean across rows). 
Then, given the number of groups 𝑐, the 2 𝑐  quantiles of the distribution of 𝑡𝑖 across banks are 
computed. The distance between each score in the low-dimensional space (Fi) and the first, 
third, fifth and seventh (i.e. the odd quantiles, 1,3, … 2𝑐 − 1 in general) quantile is computed. 
So, each bank is assigned to the closer quantile, thus originating c initial groups for each 𝐴. The 
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cluster corresponding to the seventh quantile is smaller than the other three, which are instead 
similar.30 Finally, at each run 𝑟,  the centroids ?̅? are updated as (𝑼′𝑼)−1𝑼′𝑿𝑨. 
An outlier detection component is incorporated in the above algorithm. Let us suppose we have 
estimated the reduced space ?̂? = 𝑿?̂?, which is a n x r matrix. We can exploit these low-
dimensional representations of the objects for outlier detection purposes.  If we call F̂𝑖 the i-th 
row of the matrix ?̂?, and F̅i the mean of F across the cluster to which the i-th observation 
belongs, we can define diffi = Fi − F̅i for each   𝑖 = 1, … ,365. We compute 𝑪𝑭, the unbiased 
sample covariance matrix for these low-dimensional data. The quantity ti = n diffi(CF)
−1diffi
′ 
is the relevant one to define the outliers. Under the normality assumption for 𝑿, we would have 
t~Tp,n−1
2 which is called Hotelling’s T (1931). In this case, since this assumption is violated, 
we can compute these values for all observations, and then derive, for instance, as a threshold 
the 100 x (1 − α)% -th percentile of the empirical distribution of ti across the sample. This 
value is our empirical quantile. The observations having a value for ti exceeding it are flagged 
as outliers.  
This calculation is included directly in the iterative clustering procedure. At each step, if an 
observation 𝑜i is identified as an outlier, we set Uij = 0 for j= 1, … , c, such that the observations 
pervasively distant from the centroid of any cluster are identified. In this way, outliers are 
excluded from the computation of the coefficient matrix 𝑨 and the centroid matrix ?̅? . 
The number of clusters and the number of factors have to be determined simultaneously in our 
approach. For this selection we used a step-wise approach, utilising a partition-based criterion 
to select the number of clusters combined with search in the number of factors space and then 
selecting the number of factors.  It has to be noted that in the current setting which involves 
simultaneous clustering and dimensionality reduction, the approaches of deciding on the 
number of factors based on the initial data set and its covariance matrix are not suitable. In 
contrast, our adopted approach involves first selecting the number of clusters as recommended 
in Vichi and Kiers 2001.  
A measure of the fitness of a specific clustering is given by the sum of within-cluster distances 
to centroids:  
                                                     
30 The means of the percentages of cluster belongings across our 100 runs are, respectively 0.260, 0.254, 0.269, 
and 0.217. We can see that the last group tends to be penalised, while the third is the largest by a small margin. 
This is consistent with the empirical distribution of 𝑡𝑖 across banks. 
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Wc(P, ?̅?) = ∑ ∑ 𝑑(𝑖, ?̅?𝑗)𝑖∈𝑃𝑗
𝑐
𝑗=1  
where P={P1, P2,…, Pc} is a partition of c clusters and d is the Euclidean distance measure. 
Hartigan (Hartigan 1975) has proposed a heuristic rule to select the number of clusters which 
has been shown to be effective in subsequent simulation studies (see e.g. Chiang and Mirkin 
2010). The idea of the method is that when the optimal c* is used a decrease of W with respect 
to c<c* will be observed because “coarse” clusters defined by c<c* will be split further while 
when c>c* the value of W will be relatively less volatile given that “optimal” clusters will be 
split in a random way. Hartigan suggested the calculation of the metric  
𝐻𝑐 = (𝑊𝑐 𝑊𝑐+1 − 1⁄ )(𝑝 − 𝑐 − 1) 
and selecting c when a large increase in this metric is observed when c+1 are used.31 
We provide two MATLAB functions performing the trimmed factorial k-means procedure, 
'tfkm.m' and 'tfkm_alpha.m'. The first one performs the procedure selecting the rank and the 
number of clusters by maximizing Hartigan's statistics. The second one also selects the 
trimming proportion via the same method. Details can be found at the link 
https://github.com/MatFar88/A-clustering-methodology-for-European-banks-business-
models.  
 
  
                                                     
31 Hartigan suggested specifically that when Hc > 10, the number of clusters should be selected to be equal to 
c+1. Chang and Mirkin (2010) find that this criterion works well also for different values than 10. 
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D – Sample characteristics per country 
 
Our sample is quite representative of the eurozone countries. We compare the amounts 
represented by the banks in our sample, with the ECB Consolidated Banking Statistics.  Due to 
the existence of subsidiaries and the consolidation at the entity level of all our data, their 
aggregation leads to double counting at the national level, therefore we get figures which exceed 
100% for some countries. 
 
Table D-1: Number of banks per country and total assets (in billion euros) included. 
 
  
Country Number 
of banks
Assets of 
banks 
included 
(billion euros)
Percentage of 
consolidated 
assets
Austria 22 993.3 92%
Belgium 25 1549.6 141%
Cyprus 4 48.0 63%
Germany 24 4698.2 67%
Estonia 6 15.5 70%
Spain 53 4361.8 122%
Finland 15 502.2 88%
France 48 8396.1 117%
Greece 5 353.0 96%
Ireland 7 359.5 71%
Italy 61 2697.2 100%
Lithuania 6 65.9 273%
Luxembourg 23 434.7 54%
Latvia 13 25.6 83%
Malta 3 15.3 29%
Netherlands 18 2268.3 90%
Portugal 16 377.4 89%
Slovenia 8 27.3 66%
Slovakia 8 48.9 78%
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E – Description of country-level variables and robustness checks 
 
Macroeconomic variables. Unemployment rate and the annual real GDP growth were taken 
from the Eurostat. Besides the unemployment rate for end-2014 and the real GDP growth rates 
for 2014, the average unemployment, the (annualised) growth of unemployment from 2009 to 
2016 was computed, as a measure of the macroeconomic stress of each country during the crisis. 
In addition, the average real growth for the 5 years before 2014 is also calculated as a measure 
of past macroeconomic conditions. 
Size of national financial sectors (total assets). We use Balance Sheet Items (BSI data) from the 
ECB which are based on the consolidated balance sheet of Monetary Financial Institutions 
(MFIs) – including banks, other deposit-taking firms and money market funds – but excluding 
central banks. When the value of assets of each bank in our sample is divided by this amount, 
a measure for the systemic importance of the bank within each national financial sector is 
provided.  
Bank credit-to-market ratio. We use World Bank Data from the financial development and 
structure data set as described in Beck et al. (2000) and Čihák et al. (2012). Namely, we use 
data on market capitalization of domestic firms (excluding investment funds and other 
companies which only hold shares of other listed companies, to avoid double-counting) and on 
domestic credit to the private sector provided by banks (which includes both loans and 
securities), in both cases for end-2014. Bank credit is reported on a host–country basis i.e. 
includes also subsidiaries and branches of foreign banks. Banks are defined with respect to their 
license to receive retail deposits. For Estonia, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia and Slovakia, the 
market capitalization ratio was not available, therefore data on the stock market capitalization 
to GDP were used (from the same World Bank database). As a robustness check and to account 
for the structural features of each economy, rather the snapshot at end-2014, the average figures 
for the last six years starting from 2008, for both market capitalization and bank credit, were 
also calculated and used as an alternative measure. 
Financial structure indicators. Concentration of the national banking sectors is taken from the 
ECB Statistical Data Warehouse (SDW). Two alternative measures are used, namely the 
Herfindahl index for the total assets of credit institutions and the share of total assets of the five 
(5) largest credit institutions at the end of 2014. 
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